posts are required for clinical academic staff who wish to devote most of their time to research. (17) Similarly, 100 career posts are needed for basic. scientists working in clinical research groups. (18) Funds are required for establishing approximately 50 combined MB and PhD programmes and for restoring adequate public financing of a sufficient number of intercalated BSc degree courses to its previous level. (19) The NHS must take a much greater part in the support of research and development. (20) Basic clinical teaching will continue to require attachment of students to a substantial number of inpatients. At this early stage it is important to ensure that this attachment can take place in the main teaching hospitals. (21) The NHS must be persuaded of the need for much better teaching facilities on its premises. (22) The erosion of staff time for both teaching and research caused by the implementation of Achieving a Balance must be stopped and corrected. (23) There should be better representation ofacademic medicine on the Central Manpower Committee. (24) Better mechanisms should be found for ensuring that academic needs are considered fully when staff are allocated within health regions. (25) The higher specialist training committees should be asked to make their requirements for accreditation more flexible so that future clinical academics are not constrained to a relatively few rigid training programmes. (26) Parity of salaries with NHS colleagues must be maintained for clinical academic staff and their removal expenses should be provided.
Clinicians work in an environment characterised by uncertainty and, for the most part, use intuitive methods to make choices between strategies in diagnosis and management. It comes as no surprise that they are not always successful in their choices and improvements should be looked for and welcomed. One approach would be to attempt to develop a prescriptive theory ofclinical work with its accompanying techniques. A formal method for decision making should take into account the likelihood of the outcomes of actions, the risks and benefits associated with these outcomes, and value judgments on how the patient's interests are best to be served. 4 These do not require special contemplation or complicated mathematical techniques. Diagnoses can often be made on the basis of common "epidemiological" knowledge. An elderly patient who develops weakness on one side will almost certainly have had a stroke and, beyond an understanding of the patient's circumstances, neither much knowledge nor complex inference is needed to avoid diagnostic error. In consequence, confidence in the ability to diagnose will be high and it will appear unnecessary to use complex logical or statistical diagnostic aids. Similar considerations apply to a viral illness, when knowledge of what is happening in the community will usually lead to a working diagnosis; great diagnostic precision is again unnecessary in that most patients will get better anyway, and it simply is not worthwhile investing in further investigations to identify the virus. The fact that some illnesses will indeed be caused by a virus while others will not is rightly seen as being without importance.
Resistance to objective methods of diagnosis is also seen in relation to clinical syndromes which are generally defined by historical data-for example, anxiety state, migraine, and irritable bowel syndrome. Such "I say so" diagnoses'9 depend on the definition of experts. Though the criteria used to make the diagnosis are often open to debate, personal opinion remains fixed. It is thus difficult to convince experts that more rational and precise diagnostic methods are required, particularly if the outcome is favourable with existing methods, when precision may appear to be only marginally useful.
Another reason for the slow acceptance of objective diagnostic techniques is that data collected by history or physical examination or by the use of a test are treated as essentially perfect so that uncertainties, which are capable of being handled by statistical techniques, can be ignored.20 Clinicians are also reluctant to use probability based estimates even though they are intuitively aware that diagnosis and management are based on such terms as "very likely" or "not very likely," which they tend to prefer to precise statements such as "with a probability of 095 or 0005." Even when accurate estimates are made available, they find it difficult to appreciate their meaning and incorporate them into their decisions."2 Furthermore, the psychological importance of a particular probability biases the objective value accepted into a decision theory approach.22 In clinical decision making very small probabilities are overweighted, so that rare events loom larger psychologically than they will in a decision analysis of the problem. '7 Consequently, decision analysis can lead to results which, though consistent with the information supplied and with the rules of combining various estimates, "feel wrong" psychologically. A further stumbling block is that doctors tend to use psychological perceptions of risk which relate not only to actual or subjective probabilities but also to such matters as voluntary or involuntary exposure, fear, and newness or familiarity. These other aspects of risk are not expressed in a conventional probability, although they may be salient in clinical situations. Thus, when clinicians say that they cannot express their views about the riskiness of an intervention using probability scales, they may be referring to these other perceived aspects which in an objective analysis should be ignored. For example, it should make no difference in the consideration of a probability whether one is voluntarily or involuntarily exposed to a particular risk of death. Yet the clinician's concern about obtaining informed consent from patients shows that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary exposure to a risk for the sake of an anticipated benefit is psychologically quite meaningful. The Results of Bayes's analysis for abnormal computed tomogram (CT) for suspected cerebral tumour using the same data as in the example for 2 x 2 tables BMJ VOLUME 298methods of assessment are too crude to have appeal and it is recognised that improvements are needed. We know that the theory of expected utility does not make allowance for the framing effect or for the psychological factors we have discussed (these are better described by prospect theory23).
Future scenarios
What then may we expect in the future? With advances in technology, and particularly organ imaging, the number of falsifiable diagnoses will increase. These tests will become cheaper and easily accessible. As a result of performing more tests, clinicians will become more aware of the diagnostic and management errors they make when using either simple "I say so" or "probabilistic" methods. At the same time, since the tests are performed looking for diseases with low base rates, they will need to worry more about the interpretation of a positive test result and may have difficulty in explaining their findings, owing to their lack of appreciation of the effect of base rates and the overpowering effect of the number of false positive results when testing for diseases whose base rates are low.
We ANY QUESTIONS Does royal jelly from beehives have any unusual nutritional or healing properties? Royal jelly has some important properties for the nutritional development of the immature bee farva, providing specific nutritional requirements and influencing maturation and the course of development in ways that are only partly understood. Royal jelly contains a group of biological active insect hormones. These are known to influence nucleic acid metabolism and are essential for the development of the queen bee. The jelly is also a rich source of vitamins. These special properties for the bee larva have led several people to claim that they are operational and valuable for humans. There is virtually no evidence or reason to suppose that the components have specific and desirable properties for man. Furthermore, the amount of royal jelly in most preparations is such that the dose recommended is too low to make an appreciable nutritional contribution to a human.'-D A T SOUTHGATE, head, nutrition andfood quality research, Norwich When immunising a baby born prematurely should the doctor calculate the time for immunisation from the infant's real or expected birth date? Many components of the immune system of the neonate are immature and do not attain adult levels of functioning for many months or even years. Premature infants are even less immunocompetent. Among other differences they have reduced concentrations of immunoglobulins and complement. The evidence suggests, however, that subsequent development of the immune system depends partly on antigen exposure rather than postconceptional age and despite these differences substantial data show that premature infants may be immunised effectively without allowing for their prematurity.
Smolen et al showed that preterm infants immunised with oral polio vaccine at 2 and 4 months responded as well as full term infants of the same age. Premature infants given BCG at 5 days of age had as good a rate of tuberculin conversion as a similar group of infants immunised on their expected date of delivery.2 Bernbaum et al immunised a group of infants with gestations varying from 28 to 34 weeks against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis at 8, 16, and 24 weeks after birth.' The antibody responses after the second and third doses were as good as those in full term infants immunised at the same ages. Interestingly, the preterm infants had a lower incidence of minor side effects such as behavioural changes and local reactions with 15% receiving antipyretics as opposed to 54% in the full term group. A more recent study has confirmed these findings.4
Preterm infants may be safely and effectively immunised with the routine schedules based on their actual rather than corrected age. If infants are still in the hospital neonatal unit at 3 months their immunisation should be initiated by the hospital. - 
